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The main point in issue in this case was whether the Court would have jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") to set aside an award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal which is patently illegal or in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract?

The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court can set aside the arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act, if the party making the application furnishes proof that:--

(i) (a) if the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,

(b) failing such agreement, the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.

The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to:--

The father of the appellant late B. Chandrashekhar Reddy, the husband of appellant No. 3, filed two separate declarations under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings), Act, 1973. By Order dated 23.1.1977, the Tribunal held that family of late B. Chandrashekhar Reddy was entitled to hold one standard holding under the Act and the excess of 4.3360 standard holdings was held to be surplus land. Aggrieved by this Order, an appeal was preferred before the Land Reform Appellate Tribunal as LRA No. 1107/77 which was partly allowed. Aggrieved by this Order, a revision petition C.R.P. No. 7171/79 was filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. However, during the pendency of the Revision, B. Chandrashekhar Reddy died and his LRs were impleaded. Pending this Revision application, there was a State amendment to Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act whereby Section 29A was inserted. The appellants contended that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 29-A and thus an additional ground was sought to be raised in the Revision Petition. The High Court permitted them to urge the additional ground. It was urged before the Hon'ble High court that by virtue of Section 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughters of a Hindu joint family acquired rights as a co-parcener in a joint Hindu family and thus they have got right by birth; hence, they are to be treated on the same footing as major sons and it was argued that the ceiling on land should have been fixed treating them as additional members of the family. However, the High Court rejected the plea of the appellants and held that the amendment to Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act will not alter the position and the appellants herein were not entitled to get any additional share.

The Hon'ble supreme court held that the benefit of Section 29(A) can be invoked only by major daughters if they are not married prior to the commencement of Section 29(A) of the Act. Under Section 29(A) of the Hindu Succession Act provides that the daughters acquired a right by birth as they were deemed to be treated as co-parceners of the joint family and they have got a right to seek partition of the joint family property but as regards the fixation of the ceiling, in the instant case, Section 29(A) does not confer any additional benefit to the appellant .The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal is against refusal to allow amendment of the plaint, in the suit for money decree filed by the appellant against the respondents in Delhi High Court, which, later on has been transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. The plaintiff-appellant moved an application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of CPC and Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. The main objection pressed by the respondent before the High Court was that the plaintiff has to decide at the time of filing of the suit as to whether the claim is to be made in Indian currency or the foreign currency. Once the plaintiff choose to claim the amount in Indian currency there was no occasion to allow the plaintiff to change its option and claim decree in terms of dollars. The other contention was that the amendment is sought after a long lapse of time, namely, 9 years so the additional financial liability resulting as a consequence of the amendment would be time barred. The Hon"ble Supreme court held that amendment can be refused when the effect of it would be to take away from a party, a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time and where the amendment merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, there is no good reason not to allow the same and even the bar of limitation would not come in the way. The amendment in the present case, is more clarificatory in nature as no new relief is sought to be added, only rupee equivalent of the dollar, is sought to be deleted and a clear prayer for decree in dollars is sought to be added. An amendment would generally not be disallowed, except (i) where a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, there too it would be one of the factors for consideration or (ii) where it changes the nature of the suit itself or (iii) it is malafide or (iv) the other party cannot be placed in the same position had the plaint been originally filed correctly, that is to say, the other side has lost right of a valid defence by subsequent amendment. The Hon'ble court held that in this case the amendment only clears the confusion, if any, as to the terms in which relief is sought. It does not revive a time bared and dead claim, nor changes the nature of the suit. In the facts and circumstances, it cannot be said to be malafide either. The appeal allowed.