SUPREME COURT

• CONSTITUTION

State of West Bengal and Ors. v. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors (Decided on 17.02.2010) MANU/SC/0121/2010

Constitution - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs - Article 226 of Constitution of India - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short "the CBI"), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short "the Special Police Act"), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.

Held, the High Courts are authorised under Article 226 of the Constitution, to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including any government to enforce fundamental rights and, "for any other purpose". The right conferred by Article 226 can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but "for any other purpose" as well, i.e. for enforcement of any legal right conferred by a Statute etc.

A direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.

• CRIMINAL

State of U.P. v. Guru Charan and Ors (Decided on 23.02.2010) MANU/SC/0130/2010

Criminal - Appeal against acquittal - Review of evidence - Power of Appellate Court thereof - Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Held, the Appellate Court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for reversing an order of acquittal. This Court would be justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal of the High Court only when there are very substantial and compelling reasons to discard the High Court's decision.

• TENANCY

Seshambal (dead) through L.Rs. V. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and Ors (Decided on 17.02.2010) MANU/SC/0115/2010

Tenancy - Suit for eviction of Tenanted premises - Bona fide requirement of premises claimed by Landlord - Death of Landlord-original plaintiff during pendency of proceedings - Continuity of proceedings by legal heirs of Landlord -Right thereof - Whether the proceedings instituted by the deceased-owners of the demised property could be continued by the legal heirs left behind by them ?

Held, it is not in dispute that in the eviction petition the owners had pleaded their own requirement for the premises to be occupied by them for residential as well as commercial purposes. The eviction petition was totally silent about the requirements of any member of the family of the owners- petitioners leave alone any member of their family who was dependant upon them. That being so the parties went to trial before the Rent Controller on the basis of the case pleaded in the petition and limited to the requirement of the owners for their personal occupation. Neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Appellate Authority was it argued that the requirement in question was not only the requirement of the petitioner-owners of the premises but also the requirement of any other member of their family whether dependant upon them or otherwise. Not only that, even in the petition filed before this Court the requirement pleaded was that for the deceased-widowed owner of the demised premises and not of any member of her family. Super added to all this is the fact that the legal representatives who now claim to be the family members of the deceased are all married daughters of the deceased couple each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and at different places. That none of them was dependant upon the deceased- petitioner is also a fact undisputed. Such being the position we find it difficult to see how the legal representatives of the deceased- appellant can be allowed to set up a case which was never set up before the Courts below so as to bring forth a requirement that was never pleaded at any stage of the proceedings

Therefore, on the death of the petitioners in the original eviction petition their right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time.

HIGH COURT

• LABOUR AND INDISTRIAL

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Shrinivas Narayanrao Moharil (Decided on 15.02.2010) MANU/MH/0105/2010

Labour and Industrial - Controlled Industry - Declaration of cement industry as Controlled Industry - Appropriate Government for Cement Industry - Delegation thereof - Applicability of MRTU and PULP Act - Section 30 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 2(3) of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 - Petitioner-cement industry, declared as "controlled industry", filed Writ Petition contending that State Government is not Appropriate Government for Cement Industry and therefore, provisions of MRTU & PULP Act are not applicable to Petitioner - establishment - Whether because of delegation of its power under Section 39 of ID Act by Central Government to State Government, the provisions of MRTU & PULP Act can become applicable to the Petitioner - establishment?

Held, mere delegation by Central Government to State Government does not constitute State Government an appropriate Government. State Government while acting as appropriate Government discharges the role as an agent of Central Government and hence for the purpose of Section 2(3), it cannot be said that for cement industry, State Government is appropriate Government. The provisions of MRTU & PULP Act, therefore, cannot apply to industry of the Petitioner. Writ Petition allowed.

• CONTEMPT OF COURT

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

In Re: Jasvir Singh Pawar, Advocate (Decided on 05.02.2010) MANU/UP/0052/2010

Contempt of Court - Contemnor Advocate interfering in judicial process and scandalizing Judicial Officer - Reference by lower court to High Court - Exercise of Jurisdiction by High Court - Section 2(c) of the contempt of Court Act, 1971 and Article 235 of the Constitution of India

Held, a Judge or Magistrate has a duty to discharge his/her judicial functions and he/she passes order in the manner as he/she likes fit to the best of his/her capability in the facts and circumstances of the case. The courts cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. In the present case, the conduct of the contemnor amounts to intimidating the court and lowering the authority and it clearly amounts to interference with due course of judicial proceedings which were being conducted by the Presiding officer. The power of the High Court of superintendence and control over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution includes within its ambit the duty protect members of the subordinate courts. In the above conspectus, the charge related to criminal contempt framed against the contemnor is fully established. The reference made to this Court is allowed and the contemnor is held guilty of criminal contempt.

• FAMILY

MADRAS HIGH COURT

E. Padma v. The District Collector, The Executive Officer, Thenkanikottai Town Panchayat, The Tahsildar and Assistant Director of Local Fund Audits (Decided on 18.02.2010) MANU/TN/0150/2010

Family - Issuance of Legal Heir Certificate for purpose of getting service benefits of deceased Government servant-husband - Non-inclusion of Petitioner-second wife of deceased as legal heir - Challenge thereto - Rule 49 of the Tamil Nadu Family Pension Rules, 1978

The Petitioner's contention that she is the widow of Late Errappan and covered by Rule 49 cannot be accepted. The question of a person being a widow will arise only if she is officially married wife of the deceased Government servant. As correctly set out in the circular order of the Government, the petitioner cannot be considered to a widow. In any event, the petitioner cannot compel the Tahsildar to include her name in the absence of any legal right on her favour. The order of the Tahsildar is based upon the Revenue Board instructions. The order of the Tahsildar granting Legal Heir certificate has very limited legal sanctity and it is not a final proof about the legal heirship of a person. If the petitioner claims that she is entitled to be declared as legal heir of Late Errappan, she should move the appropriate civil court for getting a succession certificate and no direction can be issued to the Tahsildar to include certain names or exclude certain names. Even in cases of inclusion of any particular name, in any subsequent proceedings for succession, the said certificate can be either ignored or declared to be invalid. Therefore, the petitioner's prayer for a direction to include her name in the Legal Heir certificate in the absence of any enforceable legal right on her part or any statutory obligation on the part of the third respondent, cannot be countenanced by this Court. Writ Petition dismissed

• MOTOR VEHICLES

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Kamla Devi and 8 Ors. (Decided on 05.02.2010) MANU/UP/0054/2010

Motor Vehicles - Accident Claim - Award by Tribunal in favour of Claimant - Appeal by Insurer against same - Maintainability of appeal - Permission of Tribunal not obtained by Insurer - Section 149(2) and Section 170 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

Held, for the filing of the appeal by the insurer it has been specifically ruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it shall be necessary to obtain permission in writing from the learned Tribunal but admittedly same has not been obtained by the appellant in the present case. There is no exception or gallery to permit the insurer to prefer an appeal without having permission in writing from the learned tribunal. In view of above, since no permission was obtained by the appellant (before approaching this Court) under Section 170 of the Act, the present F.A.F.O is not maintainable. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed.

• CONTRACT

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Vora Auto Service Centre Private Ltd. and Anr (Decided on 08.02.2010) MANU/MH/0090/2010

Contract - Contract of lease - Cessation of Juridical Possession of premise by virtue of lease - Enforcement of contractual rights - Grant of relief by Court - Challenge thereto - Plaintiff-Respondents and Defendant-Appellants entered into a contract of lease wherein Plaintiffs were appointed as contractors of Defendants for purpose of operating a retail outfit of Defendants on premise in question but were not to be in juridical possession of premise in question - Thereafter, Plaintiff sought to enforce contractual rights under said lease agreement and Trial Court granted relief of injunction - Hence, present appeal - Whether Plaintiffs entitled to any relief?

Held, the Plaintiffs' right to ownership of the land has ceased by virtue of the lease which subsists. No Court can grant relief to a party who, by virtue of his own agreement, is not shown to be in possession of the premises after the contract is determined. Granting relief of protecting the possession of the Plaintiffs, who are not in juridical possession at all and mere occupants as contractor under a contract which has come to an end upon the termination of the contract by efflux of time, would mean and constitute that the Court supplants a contract between the parties by a contract made by itself, which is contrary to the rights and obligations agreed to by the parties. Impugned order therefore, set aside. Appeal from Order allowed.